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Equity as a Vehicle for Law Reform: 
The Case of Unilateral Mistake
Irit Samet*
In this paper I ask whether English Law should permit rescission for unilateral mistakes 
in the formation of contract, in circumstances where the defendant (D) knew or should 
have known about the claimant’s (C) mistake, and if so, should Equity be (re)employed 
to deploy the remedy. The paper introduces the Caveat Emptor Common Law rule on 
this issue, which rules out rescission, and the various considerations that count in its 
favour. I argue that neither considerations from efficiency, nor those based in ethics can 
justify the current rule, and that new, flexible and morally-sensitive resolution is called 
for. If we examine the way in which Equity intervenes to reform areas of law where 
the Common Law fails to provide a satisfactory solution to legal disputes, we will see 
that the Caveat Emptor rule displays exactly the kind of defects that Equity does a 
very good job at remedying. The law on the duty to disclose information at the pre-
contractual stage emerges as an excellent example for Equity’s great potential as a vehicle 
for improving the law in a measured, nuanced and imaginative way.
* Reader in Private Law, Dickson Poon School of Law, King’s College, 
London. 
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I. Introduction
“This by nature is equitable, that no one be made richer by another’s 
loss”.1
The situation is painfully familiar: a party to contractual negotiations 
has information which is highly relevant for the subject matter of the 
purported deal. Keeping it to himself would improve his stakes, but the 
other party would be labouring under a mistake so that her share of the 
pie would be lower than if she were fully informed. The question whether 
the state would come to her assistance once the contract is signed and she 
becomes conscious of the information is part of the law on “contractual 
mistake”; this, it is widely agreed, is a “confusing and problematic area 
[of law] in England and in many of the common law countries which 
adopted the English doctrine”.2 In this paper, I discuss a very specific 
1. Dig 12.6.14 (Pomponius Sabinus 21), cited in John P Dawson, Unjust 
Enrichment: A Comparative Analysis (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 
1951) at 3.
2. Catharine MacMillan, Mistakes in Contract Law (Portland: Hart 
Publishing, 2010) at 1.
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aspect of the law on contractual mistake, and ask whether it should be 
reformed, and by what means: should we permit rescission for unilateral 
mistakes in the formation of contract, in circumstances where the 
defendant knew or should have known about the claimant’s mistake?3 
And if so, should equity be (re)employed to deploy the remedy? To 
answer these questions, I will first introduce the Common Law rule on 
this issue and the various considerations that count in its favour. I then 
ask in which cases, and in what way, equity intervenes to reform areas 
of law where the common law fails to provide a satisfactory solution. 
The next section argues that many of the justifications offered for the 
Common law rule on unilateral mistake fail, and that as a result the rule 
displays the kind of difficulties that equity is designed to address. The law 
on the duty to disclose information at the pre-contractual stage emerges 
as an excellent example for the great potential of equity to improve the 
law in a measured, nuanced and imaginative way.
The basic rule of English contract law which applies to situations of 
un-induced unilateral mistake, of which the other party knew, says that 
the 
claimant has no basis for avoiding the contract. Even if the defendant knows 
that the claimant would never have entered the contract or anything like it 
had he known the truth, the  defendant is fully entitled to take advantage 
of the mistake.4 
In spite of some well-known exceptions found in common law and 
regulation (mainly in special contexts like insurance, family, financial 
3. There are many adjacent issues which I will not discuss here, like the 
timing of the relief, the quality of the remedy or the position of third 
parties. Unilateral mistakes can also occur when a party wrongly believes 
that the written contract reflects the terms agreed upon by the parties. 
The law here is very clear: if the other party knows about (or suspects) a 
mistake he needs to shout (Commission for the New Towns v Cooper (Great 
Britain) Ltd, [1995] Ch 259 (CA (Eng))). This is a case of equitable 
estoppel and is thus a branch of a different equitable doctrine. See Terence 
Etherton, “Contract Formation and the Fog of Rectification” (2015) 68:1 
Current Legal Problems 367at 17-18. 
4. Hugh Beale, Mistake and Non-disclosure of Facts: Models for English 
Contract Law, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012) at 18. 
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markets, etc.), the residual rule is clear cut: “caveat emptor” or, “[i]f 
you don’t know, ask. If you didn’t ask, don’t complain”.5 The Caveat 
Emptor rule is a concrete expression of the belief that in a perfectly 
competitive market, aggregate utility is maximized when every person 
rationally pursues her own ends. Misrepresentation, undue influence and 
unconscionable behaviour interfere with the ideal market conditions and 
English law is more than happy to allow rescission when such reprehensible 
practices are proved;6 failure to look after your own interests is a different 
story. A peculiar gap thus emerges between the overall thrust of English 
contract law towards rules which promote fairness and social market, 
and the residual law that applies to un-induced unilateral mistakes which 
remains staunchly individualistic.7
Until the 19th century and the administrative fusion between 
common law and equity courts the common law courts did not attribute 
any importance to mistake in the formation of contract.8 One important 
reason for the neglect was that chancery procedures (cumbersome as they 
were) were much better suited to ascertaining mistakes. As a result, suits 
that involved mistake were channelled by the barristers to the Court of 
Chancery, so that the common law had no opportunity to develop a 
5. Beale, supra note 4 at 106. A detailed list of the traditional exceptions can 
be found in SM Waddams, “Precontractual Duties of Disclosure” in Peter 
Cane & Jane Stapleton, eds, Essays for Patrick Atiyah (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1991) at 237. 
6. The discussion here excludes contracts that are afflicted with undue 
influence or unconscionable bargain which raise a different set of 
questions, and the remedy for which is usually considered to be based 
on unjust enrichment principles. For a discussion of restitution in these 
cases as based on unconscionability, see Prince Saprai, “Unconscionable 
Enrichment?” in Robert Chambers, Charles Mitchell & JE Penner, 
eds, Philosophical Foundations of the Law of Unjust Enrichment (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2009) at 417.
7. On the transformation of English contract law to a social-market 
embracing law see Hugh Collins, The Law of Contract, 4d (London: 
Cambridge University Press, 2008) ch 2. 
8.  MacMillan, supra note 2 at 38.
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doctrine concerning the effect of mistake on contractual obligations.9 
Parties who laboured under a mistake and sought to rescind (or rectify) 
the resulted contract could find sympathy with the courts of equity 
who would intervene for victims of both suggestio falsi and suppressio 
veri. The latter was of course the greater innovation, as it went far beyond 
the doctrine of fraud — the closest counterpart which would be familiar 
to the common law jurists. But the equitable doctrine of unilateral 
mistake, like most of equity’s jurisdiction, was never systematised to the 
level of its common law contemporaries. Only some general principles 
can be extracted from the (not too many) cases, while the treatises of 
the 19th century provide contradictory accounts, which too often do 
not follow the case law.10 If a party seeks to enforce a contract in spite 
of the occurrence of mistake, one author tells us, he “must necessarily 
make that court [of common law] an instrument of injustice; … courts 
of equity have interposed, be restraining the party whose conscience 
is thus bound from using the advantage he has improperly gained”.11 
When equity intervened it did so in the more flexible and particularistic 
manner that typifies it.12 It offered restitution (a remedy which was 
conceived by its 19th century resuscitators as equitable in nature) 
to claimants who proved their mistake, and the unconscionability of 
9. Ibid at 39-44. A parallel line of cases in which remedy was offered to 
the mistaken party developed in Scotland, but today it is “considered 
controversial, and at most a narrow exception to the rule that an 
uninduced unilateral error is not sufficient to annul a contract”: see Reid 
& MacQueen, supra note 4 at 355-56. 
10. As shown in MacMillan, supra note 2; see also Reid & MacQueen, 
supra note 4 (a parallel line of cases in which remedy was offered to 
the mistaken party developed in Scotland, but today it is “considered 
controversial, and at most a narrow exception to the rule that an un-
induced unilateral error is not sufficient to annul a contract” at 355-58).
11. John Mitford, A Treatise on the Pleadings in Suits in the Court of Chancery 
(London: W Owen, 1787) as in MacMillan, supra note 2 at 45.
12. On the flexible nature of the equitable doctrines and how this is essential 
to their function see Henry Smith, An Economic Analysis Of Law Versus 
Equity (2010) [unpublished, archived at Harvard Law School, Harvard 
University] (in the context of property law). 
542 
 
Samet, Equity as a Vehicle for Law Reform
the other party who was silent.13 But this equitable jurisdiction to assist 
parties who suffered harm as a result of un-induced unilateral mistake 
withered away as fusion kicked in, and claims concerning mistake were 
heard by a unified High Court. And so, the question of this paper can 
be posed as: should equity reclaim its pre-fusion power and intervene in 
the parties’ common law rights where the defendant knew or should have 
known about the claimant’s substantive mistake? 
II. Justifying the Common Law Rule
Before we can judge whether equity should reclaim its authority to assist 
a party who worked under a mistake known to the other party (but not 
induced by him), we need to assess the merits of the law as it stands 
now. Under the current Caveat Emptor rule, parties to a contract are not 
under a duty to disclose information concerning the subject matter of the 
contract. People are expected to make all relevant investigations before 
committing to a contract, and have only themselves to blame if they fail 
to do so. As the courts of common law readily admit, the rule would 
strike the person on the street as unethical: “a man of tender conscience 
or high honour would be unwilling to take advantage of the ignorance of 
the other party”; it is a piece of law that clearly departs from our moral 
principles: “whatever may be the case in a court of morals, there is no 
legal obligation on the vendor to inform the purchaser that he is under 
a mistake, not induced by the act of the vendor”.14 In what follows I 
will present, briefly, some arguments to the effect that the inconsistency 
between the court of law and “the courts of morals” can be justified by 
second-order considerations of morality and public welfare. If valid, 
they show that the “tender conscience or high honour” which rejects the 
13. Even where restitutio ad integrum was impossible see Alati v Kruger (1955) 
94 CLR 216 (HCA) at 224 (when the parties were not in a position to 
give back exactly what each received under the contract ). Also see more 
examples of equity’s flexibility in this matter in Jamie Glister & James 
Lee, Hanbury & Martin Modern Equity, 19d (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 
2012) at 29-001. 
14. Smith v Hughes (1871), LR 6 QB 597 (Eng) at 604, per Chief Justice 
Cockburn, and at 607, per Justice Blackburn.
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Caveat Emptor rule merely reflects moral intuitions that cannot survive a 
more reflective survey of the full range of considerations which apply to 
the legal treatment of un-induced mistakes.
In his book on restitution, Hanoch Dagan offers a powerful 
argument for the position that the law on restitution should be read as an 
expression of our commitment to the values of autonomy and utility, as 
well as to the value of community welfare.15 This is not the place to assess 
the merits of his argument, but in what follows I discuss considerations 
in favour of the Caveat Emptor rule that concern both the parties to the 
dispute and the wider community. If, like Ernest Weinrib, you believe that 
only consideration of corrective justice (i.e. strictly between the parties 
to the dispute) should be taken into account when deciding disputes 
about the right to restitution (and in private law in general), you will 
discard reasons B-E below as irrelevant.16 But if, like Dagan, you believe 
that a solution to these issues should be offered from a wide perspective 
which includes the effect of the decision on society as whole, you will 
(hopefully) find all the arguments (and counter arguments) in Part IV 
interesting and relevant. One more methodological note about mixing 
arguments from morality and efficiency: when thinking about rules of 
contract law, we need not worry too much about efficiency-oriented 
considerations crowding out concerns of morality. For in this area of the 
law, they actually tend to work in tandem, and lead in the same direction. 
As Charles Fried explains, the “convergence of [law-and-economics and 
normative analyses] is particularly salient [in] the design of institutions 
that facilitate the coordination, through agreements, of the energies of 
15. Hanoch Dagan, The Law and Ethics of Restitution (London: Cambridge 
University Press, 2004) ch 2. 
16. For example, see Ernest Weinrib, “Restoring Restitution” (2005) 91:3 
Virginia Law Review 861.
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otherwise independent persons”.17 Contradictory results may, of course, 
be found, but in our case these often incommensurable values converge 
quite nicely, and I will therefore leave this thorny issue for another time.
A. Moral Value 1: No Legal Duty to Prevent Harm
One argument against imposing a duty of disclosure on parties to 
contractual negotiations links it to the law’s general reluctance to impose 
positive duties to assist other people in need. English law does not 
normally order us to save other people, even from severe harm, unless 
we actively contributed to its occurrence. This, it is widely agreed, is a 
good policy. The regulation of society ought to be achieved by means of 
prohibiting harmful acts, rather than by obliging citizens to engage in 
harm-preventing activities.18 Two compelling thoughts are mentioned in 
support of this “no action no liability” principle. First, “a legal system that 
proscribed non-doing alongside doing would be profoundly intrusive … 
present individuals with fewer opportunities to avoid liability … (and is) 
likely to impinge to a greater extent upon one’s interests”.19 Obligations 
to act limit the liberty of citizens to a greater degree than prohibitions 
since forbidding us from doing still leaves us with the freedom to engage 
in endless other non-doing actions. But when we are ordered to do X, 
in contrast, this is likely to tie us up for the duration, as we can hardly 
17. Charles Fried, “The Ambitions of Contract as Promise” in Gregory Klass, 
George Letsas & Prince Saprai, eds, Philosophical Foundations of Contract 
Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014) at 23; see also Avery Katz, 
“Economic Foundations of Contract Law” in Klass, at 175; Eyal Zamir 
& Barak Medina, Law, Economics, and Morality (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2010)(who say with regards to the parties’ duties in the 
pre-contractual stage that “incorporating deontological constraints with 
economic analysis of contract law may be fruitful” at 350).
18. On the viability of the “act requirement” as a descriptive, as well as 
evaluative claim, see Douglas Husak, “Does Criminal Liability Require an 
Act?” in Douglas Husak, The Philosophy of Criminal Law: Selected Essays 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2010) at 287-393.
19. AP Simester, “Why Omissions are Special” (1995) 1:3 Legal Theory 
311 at 325; and Tony Honoré, Responsibility and Fault (Portland: Hart 
Publishing, 1999) at 54.
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engage (attentively) in more than two activities at a time.20 A good 
legal system, one that is concerned to protect the liberty of the citizens, 
would therefore operate by way of banning harm-causing activities, and 
introduce only a few positive prescriptions to top up these prohibitions, 
where this is necessary.
The other reason for the law’s reluctance to order us to prevent harm 
is rooted in a widely held view about moral responsibility. By focusing 
on the people whose actions brought about a certain harm, and largely 
ignoring those who failed to help the victim to escape it, the law mirrors 
an essential difference in the degree of their respective responsibility for 
that harm. The standard example contrasts the man who did not help 
a drowning child, with the man who pushed her into the deep waters. 
While the behaviour of the person who noticed the unfortunate event 
but went on reading his paper on the beach is morally reprehensible 
(or monstrous), his blameworthiness is markedly different from that 
of the person who drove her over the cliff. Wrapping them together in 
one blanket of moral and legal responsibility would dilute the sense of 
personal responsibility, as perpetrators and bystanders will come to share 
a vague impersonal group responsibility. The norms of a legal system, 
which aims to gain the moral approval of the citizenry, must reflect this 
deep-seated moral intuition about the strong link between accountability 
and agency by sharply differentiating people who bring about harm 
from people who fail to prevent it. Together, these arguments present 
a powerful case against imposing legal responsibility for failing to help 
other people when their problem was not of your doing. The common 
law goes as far as declining to mandate actions to save other people’s lives, 
20. Michael S Moore, Placing Blame: A Theory of the Criminal Law (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2010) at 241; Jonathan Bennett, “Morality 
and Consequences” (The Tanner Lectures on Human Values delivered 
at Bransenose College, Oxford University, 6, 19, 23 May 1980) at 
66 [unpublished]. This is not necessarily the case in respect of every 
prohibition and obligation to act, as demonstrated by Patricia Smith, 
“Omission and Responsibility in Legal Theory” (2003) 9:3 Legal Theory 
221 at 232-33; Victor Tadros, Criminal Responsibility (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2007) ch 7.3.1, and others. But as a general observation 
about the operation of the law in democratic societies it is good enough. 
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even when the effort required is minimal.21 The thought is that the huge 
gap that is thereby created between what we owe each other in morality 
and in law can be understood in light of the setback to freedom which 
legal positive duties inevitably lead to. And if a duty to save lives cannot 
overcome this mighty barrier, a duty to save people from self-induced 
mistakes stands no chance. The Caveat Emptor rule is thus understood as 
an expression of fundamental principles which concern the relationship 
between law, liberty and moral responsibility.
B. Moral Value 2: Self-Reliance
“I can buy my neighbour’s land for a song, although I know and he 
doesn’t that it is oil-bearing. That isn’t dishonest, it is ‘smart business’ 
and the just reward for my superior individualism”.22 In this and other 
similar quotes from around the common law world, the Caveat Emptor 
rule is perceived as sending a message to patrons of the law that unless 
their agency (in the philosophical sense) is defective, or they are in some 
serious way dependent on the other party, they are expected to look 
after their own affairs. This expectation is a mark of respect for people’s 
autonomy, and of their ability (and right) to decide how to allocate their 
resources — in this case, whether, and how much, to invest in finding 
out what is (for them) the true value of a certain contract. Moreover, 
industrious women and men that look after their business, rather than 
look to others to get them out of the mud should be rewarded, as such 
diligence is the basis for economic prosperity. The Caveat Emptor rule is 
thus an expression of dearly held values of autonomy and self-reliance.
C. Social Benefit 1: Certainty
The next argument in favour of the Caveat Emptor rule highlights the way 
in which it exemplifies a cluster of legal virtues that are often grouped 
together under the heading “rule of law”. The rule of law is an exemplary 
21. Civil law systems take a different stance, see Martin Vranken, “Duty to 
Rescue in Civil Law and Common Law: Les Extrêmes se Touchent?” 
(1998) 47:4 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 934.
22. Blair v National Security Insurance Co, 126 F (2d) 955 (3rd Cir 1942 
(US)) at 958, per Chief Justice Clark.
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state of affairs wherein 
legal norms fixed and announced beforehand – norms which make it possible 
to foresee with fair government in all its actions is bound by certainty how the 
authority will use its coercive power, and to plan one’s individual affairs on the 
basis of this knowledge.23 
The rule of law is designed to protect human dignity from the arbitrary 
power of the state by limiting the extent to which its agents can meddle 
with people’s long term planning.24 If I cannot know with reasonable 
clarity what the law is going to be like in the long term (because it changes 
constantly, or is retroactive), or if I cannot know what it demands of me 
(because it is unclear or unpublicized), or if it is impossible to predict how 
it will apply to my circumstances (because it is ad hoc or not enforced by 
the judiciary), then I cannot design my projects in a way that stirs clear 
of the law. As a result, my investment in meaningful long-term projects 
can be frustrated by the state at any moment. Such appalling state of 
affairs is not only an affront to the citizens’ sense of dignity, but it will 
also decrease the overall efficiency of transactions, the planning of which 
requires information about the relevant law.25 
Lon Fuller’s famous list of rule of law desiderata is designed to replace 
the arbitrary reign of humans who are given excessive discretion (be they 
judges or government officials) with rule of rules that set in a clear way 
what would be the legal ramifications of your actions. A good law, he 
says, “is the enterprise of subjecting human conduct to the governance of 
rules”;26 or, in the words of Justice Scalia: “A government of laws means a 
government of rules”.27 These observations are thought to be true for any 
23. This is an adaptation of Hayek’s definition (adopted by Raz), with “legal 
norms” replacing his “rules” see Joseph Raz, The Authority of Law: Essays 
on Law and Morality (New York: Oxford University Press, 1979) at 210. 
24. Ibid at 220.
25. Louis Kaplow, “General Characteristics of Rules” in Gerrit de Geest & 
Francesco Parisi, eds, Production of Legal Rules (Northampton: Edward 
Elgar, 2011) at 502; and review of the literature in Barbara Luppi & 
Francesco Parisi, “Rules versus Standards” in Geest, ibid.
26. Lon L Fuller, The Morality of Law (New Haven and London: Yale 
University Press, 1964) at 106.
27. Morrison v Olson, 487 US 654 (1988).
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area of law. But when it comes to what Lord Mansfield called "mercantile 
transactions", the legal virtue of certainty is of such importance, that 
he thought that “it is of more consequence that a rule be certain, than 
whether the rule is established one way or the other”.28 This may be a 
little extreme, but the message is clear: in the context of legal norms that 
effect commercial relationships, adherence to the rule of law ideal is of 
a particular value, as the ability to calculate one’s risk is a crucial factor 
in determining the worthiness of a transaction. Respect for autonomy 
(in choosing what transactions to engage in) and concern for efficiency 
both push hard for a commercial law that comprises of clear, general 
and predictable rules. From this point of view, the Caveat Emptor rule 
is an exemplary norm; it makes it crystal clear what is required around 
the negotiation table and what is not, and cuts the costs of litigations, as 
there is minimum space for court discretion as to its application. Sticking 
to the rule, even when the defendant turns out to be a selfish opportunist, 
may seem offensive at first sight, but sticking to the rule is the only way 
to secure the benefits promised by the rule of law. Under the surface, the 
caveat emptor law is a boon to the citizens’ autonomy, well-being and 
material welfare.
D. Social Benefit 2: Law for Export
The benefits of a system of legal rules that abides by the requirements 
of the rule of law desiderata accrue to any legal system that adopts this 
model. But in England, zealous devotion to the virtues of clarity and 
predictability generates an extra social good: it supports a lucrative line 
of export, namely, commercial litigation. As Hugh Beale explains,
[o]ur courts handle many cases that have no real connection with England 
save that the parties have chosen that the contract should be governed by 
English law. This is often coupled with a choice of England and Wales as the 
jurisdiction. This ‘law for export’ has deliberately been kept even closer to the 
classical model than the law for domestic consumption.29 
The English strict position on rescission for unilateral mistakes is a 
primary example of such adherence to rule-based law in which the need 
28. Vallejo v Wheeler (1774), 1 Cowp 143 (KB (Eng)) at 153.
29. Beale, supra note 4 at 116.
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for discretionary ex-post judicial decision-making is, to a great extent, 
eliminated. This approach is indeed very different from the position of 
other European systems, which may explain why drafters of many 
business to business (“B2B”) contracts indeed choose England as their 
jurisdiction. The relevant section of the Principles of European Contract 
Law captures the spirit of the typical European law on this crucial issue: 
Artic le  4:103 (Fundamental Mistake as to Facts or Law) establishes 
that a party who has entered a contract under a mistake of fact may avoid 
it provided that:
a) the other party knew or ought to have known of the mistake, and it was 
contrary to good faith and fair dealing to leave the mistaken party in error; and
b) the other party knew or ought to have known that the mistaken party, had 
it known the truth, would not have entered the contract or would have done 
so only on fundamentally different terms.30 
The flexibility and discretion which are embedded in norms of this 
kind make the European law less clear and predictable than its English 
counterpart. And as predictability carries with it a parcel of benefits that 
are of utmost importance in the commercial world, the Caveat Emptor 
rule may well be making a direct contribution to a thriving export sector.31
E. Social Benefit 3: Generating Socially-Beneficial 
Information
In what has by now become a classic in legal economics, this argument 
demonstrates how a rule that allows a negotiating party to keep valuable 
information to himself incentivises entrepreneurial folks to unearth 
the true value of a piece of property which a placid owner may miss 
30. Ole Lando & Hugh Beale, eds, Principles of European Contract Law 
(Netherlands: Kluwer Law International, 2000) at 191. 
31. More on English law as an export sector can be found at: http://www.
theguardian.com/law/2013/feb/07/uk-law-booming-export-crime and 
https://www.justice.gov.uk/downloads/publications/corporate-reports/
MoJ/legal-services-action-plan-0313.pdf. 
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altogether.32 A standard example is the owner of land who uses it for 
agricultural purposes without ever bothering to find out whether it holds 
riches like minerals or natural gas; another is the owner of an art collection 
who neglects to investigate the pedigree of the works on her walls, and 
thus deprives the world of a long-lost masterpiece. Those who are willing 
to take the initiative and invest in finding out the true value of a piece of 
property they do not own, will only do so if they can somehow benefit 
from it.33 And so, by allowing parties to keep to themselves information 
about the subject matter of the contract, the law dangles the chance of fat 
profit in front of their eyes and encourages them to make the necessary 
investment. If information which affects the price need not be shared 
with lacklustre owners, the go-getters will presumably keep trying to 
uncover the real potential of what's around them. And so, again, we need 
to lift our eyes from the predicament of the owner who finds out that her 
ignorance led her to enter a loss-making deal; if instead, we focus on the 
interests of society at large, the Caveat Emptor rule, which at first looked 
morally bankrupt, will appear in a wholly different light. In a state of 
scarce resource, we should strive to end underuse of property which is the 
result of sheer passivity. The Caveat Emptor rule is promoting a state of 
affairs in which property ends up in the hand of those who realise its full 
potential. And this is the most efficient manner of allocating our limited 
resources.
III. When and Why Equity Intervenes in the Parties’ 
Common Law Rights
In the rest of this paper I will argue that while the concerns raised by 
the above arguments are genuine and must be taken on board when 
thinking about the law's response to situations of unilateral mistake, they 
32. Jack Hirshleifer, “The Private and Social Value of Information and the 
Reward to Inventive Activity” (1971) 61 The American Economic Review 
561.
33. Anthony T Kronman, “Mistake, Disclosure, Information, and the Law 
of Contracts” (1978) 7:1 Journal of Legal Studies 1 (“[a] rule permitting 
non-disclosure is the only effective way of providing an incentive to invest 
in the production of such knowledge” at 9).
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cannot support the current Caveat Emptor rule. We should, instead, 
reclaim the equitable authority to rescind the contract where the claimant 
can prove that the defendant knew, or should have known, that she is 
unaware of a critical piece of information, and nevertheless went ahead 
with the contract without alerting her to the mistake. The Caveat Emptor 
rule should become a well-defined exception to a rule that mandates 
disclosure of important details to the other party.
If equity were to intervene so as to disallow the informed party to 
insist on enforcing his contractual rights (to performance or compensation 
in its lieu), it would not do so on the basis of defective consent on the 
part of the ignorant party. Rather, equity would step in because the 
conscience of the defendant is affected by the way he sticks to 
his common law rights. Unconscionability, as Catharine MacMillan 
shows, has always been the historical basis of intervention in cases 
of un-induced unilateral mistake. “The principle is that it is against 
conscience for a man to take advantage of the plain mistake of another, 
or, at least, that a court of equity will not assist him in so doing”.34 
Equity, in other words, works in a very specific way, by introducing a 
new factor to the equation: the defendant’s conscience. It is therefore one 
thing to say that the rules on pre-contractual disclosure ought to change, 
and quite another to argue that a good way to do so is by means of 
equitable jurisdiction. And so, in this section, I look briefly at the very 
particular way in which equity acts to correct defects in common law 
rules. When we then move to examine why and where the Caveat Emptor 
rule fails, it will become clear that the unique way in which equity steps 
in to undo the damage of failing common law rules is particularly suitable 
for this situation; or, so I hope.
For many critics, even if the current law on unilateral mistake requires 
reform, equity would be the wrong means of bringing it about. Equity’s 
distinctive modus operandi, they claim, disqualifies it from adjudicating 
commercial law disputes, or, indeed, from deciding the majority of cases 
in private law. This is because equity grants excessive discretion to judges, 
34. Manser v Back (1848), 6 HARE 443 (Ch (Eng)) at 448; MacMillan, supra 
note 2 at 45.
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gives them a de facto licence to decide cases according to their private 
beliefs and encourages them to bend the common law rules when these 
do not reflect the current moral sensitivities of the society (or class) in 
which the court is embedded. In that way, it introduces into private 
law a highly unwelcome dimension of subjectivity and uncertainty and 
shows disrespect for the democratic processes of law making. Famous 
proponents of equity, like Justice Benjamin Cardozo from US Supreme 
Court, readily admit that equity’s way of doing things has an adverse 
effect on the generality and certainty of the law: “[t]he plastic remedies 
of the chancery are moulded to the needs of justice”; one of equity’s 
central characteristic, he maintained, is its ability to answer “the call of 
the occasion”.35 And thus, whereas Cardozo J celebrates the way in which 
equity empowers the judge to deviate from steadfast rules, wave aside 
the need for precedential stability and focus on a just solution to the 
case at hand, the critics believe that this behaviour disqualifies it from 
adjudicating disputes in private law.
All the features of equity which are of concern to this critique of 
equity as a mode of decision making in law are encapsulated in the 
concept of “unconscionability”, which “was and remains the fulcrum 
upon which entitlement to equitable relief turns”.36 Equity, right from its 
birth, embarked on a quest after legal results that please the conscience.37 
And even as legal historians debate the question of what this reference to 
“conscience” meant for the very first courts of equity, there is no doubt 
that since the celebrated case of the Earl of Oxford’s Case,38 chancery 
35. Foreman v Foreman, 167 NE 428 at 429 (Cali App Ct 1929 (US)); Judge 
Cardozo in Adams v Champion, 294 US 231 (1935) at 237. 
36. Lift Capital Partners Pty Ltd v Merrill Lynch International, [2009] NSWSC 
7 (Austl) at para 126, per Justice Barrett. 
37. Helmut Coing, “English Equity and the Denunciatio Evangelica of the 
Canon Law” (1955) 71:2 Law Quarterly Review 223 at 224 (in that, 
it was different from civilian systems which never pursued this course 
even when they implemented parallel mechanisms of naturalis aequitas 
borrowed from Roman law); and Timothy S Haskett, “The Medieval 
English Court of Chancery” (1996) 14:2 Law and History Review 245 at 
267.
38. (1615) Rep Ch 1 (Eng). 
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judges who talked about conscience referred to the inner compass 
which tells us right from wrong: “The Office of the Chancellor says 
Lord Ellesmere ‘Chancellor is to correct Men’s consciences for Frauds, 
Breach of Trusts, Wrongs … ”39 and therefore “[w]hen a Judgment is 
obtained by Oppression, Wrong and a hard Conscience, the Chancellor 
will frustrate and set it aside, not for any error or Defect in the Judgment, 
but for the hard Conscience of the Party”.40 
The idea that legal relationships can be assessed by the court 
according to their fit with conscience was never to everyone's liking. As 
early as 1526 we can find Thomas Audley grumbling about “a law called 
‘conscience’, which is always uncertain, and depends on the greater part 
on the ‘arbytrement’ of the judge; by reason thereof no man is certain 
of knowing his title to any land”.41 And ever since then judging in 
accordance with the standard of conscionability has been described, 
by proponents and opponents alike, as tending “not so much to the 
formation of ﬁxed and immutable rules, [but] rather to a determination 
of the conscionability or justice of the behaviour of the parties according 
to recognised moral principles”;42 and equity’s grand aims and critical 
principles were understood as determining its adaptable and flexible 
nature. As soon as equity in England emerged in the 1980s from a long 
period of hibernation and took the decisive step of “mov[ing] out of the 
39. Ibid at 7. 
40. Ibid at 11. See also AJ Duggan, “Is Equity Efficient?” (1997) 113:4 
Law Quarterly Review 601 at 617, 619. For the view that the term 
“conscience” in medieval times signified a different (more flexible) 
evidence gathering procedures, see MR Macnair, “Equity and Conscience” 
(2007) 27:4 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 659. 
41. Cited by Margaret McGlynn, The Royal Prerogative and the Learning of the 
Inns of Court (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004) at 188; and 
John Selden’s quip from a hundred and fifty years later as in John Selden, 
Richard Milward & Edward Arber, Table-talk (London: A Murray & Son, 
1689)(“[f ]or Law we have a measure … [but equity judges want to] make 
the standard for the measure, we call a foot, a Chancellor’s Foot” at 46 
solidified into an idiom that haunts equity to this day). 
42. ICF Spry, The Principles of Equitable Remedies: Specific Performance, 
Injunctions, Rectification and Equitable Damages, 7d (Sydney: Lawbook 
Co, 2007) at 6.
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family home and … into the market place”, 43 the old concerns about its 
subjectivity resurfaced with vengence. The target was, again, equity’s 
resort to categories of conscience: “unconscionability” declared one 
fierce opponent of equity’s renewed force, “[is] as vague and unstable 
a concept as could well be found”.44 The heaviest fire is directed 
against the suggestion that unconscionability can be used as a general 
liability head, over and above what we find in individual doctrines 
which contain an unconscionability element, like breach of trust or 
proprietary estoppel.45 
But unconscionability can take a less adventurous form as an 
integral part of well-defined doctrines so that its meaning is developed 
in tandem with other parts of the doctrine as the courts go about 
deciding cases that fall under its heading. When applied in that way, the 
conscionability standard is considered by many to be a most useful tool 
for achieving the goals set by the doctrine of which it is a part. Thus, 
in the recent case of Cavendish Square Holding BV v Talal El Makdessi 46 
(“Cavendish”) the UK Supreme Court decided that the question whether 
a contractual obligation amounts to a “fine” — and would hence be 
struck down — is to be determined by an unconscionability test.47 
Looking back at the historical roots of the doctrine, the court observes that 
whereas the Common Law rule on when a clause would be considered an 
unenforceable fine was “mechanical in effect and involve[d] no exercise 
43. Lord Justice Millett, “Equity – The Road Ahead” (1995–96) 6 King’s 
College Law Journal 1 at 4.
44. Peter Birks, “Meagher, Gummow and Lehane’s Equity Doctrines and 
Remedies” (2004) 120:2 Law Quarterly Review 344 at 345; on the 30 
years stagnation of equity in English law until the 80s see PJ Millett, 
“Equity’s Place in the Law of Commerce” (1998) 114:2 Law Quarterly 
Review 214.
45. In England, see Hussey v Palmer, [1972] EWCA Civ 1 (Lord Denning’s 
(in)famous “constructive trust of a new model”) that has been described 
in Carly v Farrelly, [1975] 1 NZLR 356 (SC) by Justice Mohan (“justice 
[being] consigned to the formless void of individual moral opinion” at 
367).
46. Cavendish Square Holding BV v Talal El Makdessi, [2015] UKSC 67 
[Cavendish]. 
47. Ibid at para 213.
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of discretion at all”, in the “equitable jurisdiction … the classification 
of terms for the purpose of the penalty rule depends on the substance 
of the term and not on its form or on the label which the parties have 
chosen to attach to it”.48 This latter approach was endorsed by the 
post Judicature Acts High Court. In Cavendish, the Supreme Court set 
out to dispel some misguiding frills that had been added to the test 
over the years, and firmly established that “[t]he question whether [the 
clause is] enforceable should depend on whether the means by which the 
contracting party’s conduct is to be influenced are ‘unconscionable’”.49 
Indeed, as the Court immediately admits, it can be argued that the old-
new rule "undermines the certainty which parties are entitled to expect 
of the law”.50 However, the Court’s discretion in this context is well-
defined and confined to examination of the remedies for breach, rather 
than a “jurisdiction to review the content of the substantive obligations 
which the parties have agreed [on]”.51 As such the conscionability test 
preserves the right balance between the need for a flexible substance-
based mode of decision-making, and the values of predictability and 
stability, so crucial to contract law.52 An equitable duty not to withhold 
critical information in the pre-contractual stage would similarly employ 
the unconscionability standard in a regimented form.
Yet, embeddedness in the doctrine is unlikely to appease all the critics. 
For the conscionability element, even in its tamed version, still expresses 
equity’s willingness to employ flexible, morally-sensitive principles, and 
a mode of legal reasoning that is ex-post and discretionary in nature. 
Equity, to put it this way, undercuts the rule of law in that it replaces 
certain, predictable and general rules with investigations into something 
as tentative as the defendant’s conscience. I have argued elsewhere that 
the view of conscience as an idiosyncratic inner voice — a “set of deep-
seated but idiosyncratic convictions” — is what gives rise to many of 
48. Else (1982) Ltd v Parkland Holdings Ltd, [1994] 1 BCLC 130 (CA (Civ)
(Eng)) at 144, per Justice Hoffmann; Cavendish, supra note 46 at para 15. 
49. Ibid at para 31.
50. Ibid at para 33.
51. Ibid at para 42. 
52. Ibid.
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the worries lest legal categories of conscionability will lead to over-
subjective results.53 Equity, however, is employing a completely different 
model of conscience. The equitable standard of conscionability is built 
on an objectivist model which takes seriously both the phenomenon 
of conscience as a deep personal conviction and the objectivity of the 
moral principles it invokes.54 The “voice of conscience” is an expression 
of a powerful inclination to abide by what we perceive as a universal 
moral duty, even in the face of adverse consequences to our interests.55 
The conscionability standard thus invites the court to delve into a pool 
of shared morality, viz, the collection of norms that are accepted by 
conscientious people, and scoop out the answer to the question “what 
was the moral duty of the defendant in the circumstances”?56
The appeal to shared morality assumes that the answers to many of 
the moral dilemmas faced by defendants are out there, and that a sincere 
53.  As the subjective interpretation of the term would suggest, see Irit Samet, 
“What Conscience Can Do for Equity” (2012) 3:1 Jurisprudence 13. 
Some like Peter Birks, profess moral relativism that undermines any claim 
by the conscience to offer a path for moral truth (Peter Birks, “Annual 
Miegunyah Lecture: Equity, Conscience, and Unjust Enrichment” 
(1999) 23:1 Melbourne University Law Review 1). See David Enoch, 
“Disagreement”, Taking Morality Seriously (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2011) at 159 (for one of many powerful attacks on moral relativism 
of this kind).
54. Or so I have argued: see Samet, supra note 53.
55. Immanuel Kant, Critique of Practical Reason (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1997) at 5.
56. Such appeal to common morality is not at all unique to equity. Tort 
law and property law make extensive use of shared understanding of 
the normative basis of legal rights and duties, both in order to confer 
legitimacy on the legal result and in order to use the moral “know how” 
to reduce the information costs of abiding by the law. See e.g. John CP 
Goldberg & Benjamin C Zipursky, “The Moral of MacPherson” (1998) 
146:6 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 1733 at sec III; Andrew 
S Gold & Henry E Smith, “How Private Law is Simply Moral” online: 
<lawf.biu.ac.il/library/mb/9GoldSmith.pdf>; Jeremy Waldron, “Inhuman 
and Degrading Treatment: The Words Themselves” (2010) 23:2 Canadian 
Journal of Law & Jurisprudence 269 at 284. In the context of property 
law see Smith, supra note 12.
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quest and attention to one’s inner moral compass makes them readily 
available. The concern lest equity gives the judge a carte blanche 
to impose on the parties his or her own idiosyncratic values, with all 
the damage that such licence would cause to the rule of law, is therefore 
unwarranted.
Once we have cleared the suspicions that equity is a “sort of moral 
U.S. fifth cavalry riding to the rescue every time a claimant is left worse off 
than he anticipated as a result of the defendant behaving badly”57 we can 
look for the working principle on the basis of which equity departs from 
the common law. Equity, I wish to argue, has a specialised role to play 
in our system, a role that is closely associated with the conscionability 
standard and its appeal to moral norms. Unfortunately, I do not have 
enough space here to expand on the argument or demonstrate how 
it works across a wide range of equitable doctrines.58 Below is a brief 
summary of a theory about the way in which equity works to amend 
defects in the common law. My hope is that even in this nascent form, 
it will help us understand why resorting to equity would be a good way 
of reforming the law on un-induced unilateral mistake.
Equity has a clear vocation, and a distinct way of fulfilling it: it 
operates on the side of the common law to promote a legal virtue which 
I call the “[a]ccountability [c]orrespondence”: when legal rules impose 
liability it should ideally correspond to the pattern of moral duty in 
the circumstances to which the rules apply. Barring unusual cases, the 
best way in which law can serve morality is by complying with the 
accountability correspondence requirement, namely, by ensuring that 
where legal liability is attached to an action it closely follows the matrix 
57. David Neuberger, “The Stuffing of Minerva’s Owl? Taxonomy and 
Taxidermy in Equity” (2009) 68 Canadian Journal of Linguistics 537 at 
540; see also Ben McFarlane, The Law of Proprietary Estoppel (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2014) ch 5 for a careful and comprehensive 
review of the meaning of unconscionability in estoppel cases law. 
58. As I attempt to do in my forthcoming book Irit Samet, Equity Goes to 
Market (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017). 
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of moral accountability for this action.59 Major reforms which were 
designed to introduce greater convergence between legal liability and 
our perception of moral accountability have been introduced in many 
areas of law.60 This is because a law in which the legal result is out of 
kilter with our deep convictions about moral accountability is not only 
dubious from the perspective of justice, it is also bound to alienate its 
addressees — the judiciary as well as the citizens. 
The law, like any social institution, requires legitimacy if it is to 
develop and operate effectively.61 And citizens are much more likely 
to become self-regulatory, that is, adopt a proactive approach for law 
abidance (rather than merely respond to external incentives) where the 
59. The principle of accountability correspondence does not take a stance in 
the question which actions should have legal liability attached to them. 
It only says that once we decide that agents of action X should bear legal 
consequences, legal liability and moral responsibility for this action should 
be aligned.
60. Prominent examples would be the struggle to lessen the effects of “legal 
luck” on criminal responsibility, and the move from the traditional view 
that company directors’ duty is to maximise of shareholders’ profits, 
to the idea that they need to advance the “company’s success” which 
is measured also by reference to “the firm’s impact on the community 
and the environment” and its “reputation for high standards of business 
conduct” (see Yoram Shachar, “Wresting Control from Luck: The Secular 
Case for Aborted Attempts” (2008) 9:1 Theoretical Inquiries in Law 139; 
Companies Act 2006 (UK), c 46, s 172; Florian Wettstein, “The Duty 
to Protect: Corporate Complicity, Political Responsibility, and Human 
Rights Advocacy” (2010) 96 Journal of Business Ethics 33; Michael 
Blowfield & Alan Murray, Corporate Responsibility (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2011)).
61. Numerous legal policies seem to be premised on the thought that 
compliance is secured by the presence of sanctions for wrongdoers, but 
recent studies suggest that deterrence, although it sometimes significantly 
influences law-related behaviour, will, at other times, have no such effect 
(see Daniel Kahan, “The Secret Ambition of Deterrence” (1999) 113:2 
Harvard Law Review 413); see also Daniel Nagin, “Criminal Deterrence 
at the Onset of the 21st Century” (1998) 23 Crime and Justice: A Review 
of Research 1 (much of the discussion was focused, naturally, on criminal 
policies).
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government and its institutions — like the police and the courts — are 
perceived as legitimate.62 In the context of legal systems, legitimacy would 
mean “the belief that the law and agents of the law are rightful holders 
of authority; that they have the right to dictate appropriate behaviour 
and are entitled to be obeyed”.63 Such sense of legitimacy can be 
rooted in different aspects of the authority’s actions and decisions.64 
For our purposes, it is important to note that legitimacy perceptions, 
and the respect (or disrespect) for the law that follows, are strongly 
influenced by people’s evaluation of legal results as just (or unjust). The 
connection between perceived legitimacy and the citizen’s tendency to 
identify with the law and follow it willingly is so strong, that at the end 
of their classic study of the correlation between community views and 
criminal codes, Paul Robinson and John Darley state that “the moral 
credibility of the criminal code is its single most important asset”.65 The 
62. Tom R Tyler, Why People Obey the Law (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton 
University Press, 2006) ch 5.
63. Jonathan Jackson et al, “Why Do People Comply with The Law? 
Legitimacy and the Influence of Legal Institutions” (2012) 52:6 British 
Journal of Criminology 1053.
64. For example see Tyler, supra note 62, ch 9-11; Stephen Schulhofer, Tom 
Tyler & Aziz Huq, “American Policing at a Crossroads: Unsustainable 
Policies and the Procedural Justice Alternative” (2011) 101:2 Journal of 
Criminal Law and Criminology 305 (it has been shown that when legal 
enforcement institutions, like the police, follow principles of procedural 
fairness (understood mainly as allowing defendants a fair opportunity to 
state their case), it will significantly reduce the cost and alienation that are 
associated with policies which rely on threats to secure obedience); see also 
Jackson, supra note 63 (for similar results in the UK).
65. Paul H Robinson & John M Darley, Justice, Liability, and Blame: 
Community Views and the Criminal Law (Boulder: Westview Press, 1995) 
at 202. On the strong effect of result-based evaluation of the law on 
obedience, see also June L Tapp & Felice J Levine, “Persuasion to Virtue: 
A Preliminary Statement” (1970) 4:4 Law & Society Review 565; June 
L Tapp & Lawrence Kohlberg, “Developing Senses of Law and Legal 
Justice” (1971) 27:2 Journal of Social Issues 65; Kevin Carlsmith, John 
Darley & Paul Robinson, “Why Do We Punish? Deterrence and Just 
Deserts as Motives for Punishment” (2001) 83 Journal of Personality and 
Social Psychology 284.
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“community views” about how a certain set of circumstances should be 
resolved is thus “an essential consideration that ought to be influential 
factor in the policy-making and code drafting process, [because] [t]he 
compliance power of criminal law is directly proportional to its moral 
credibility”.66
This conclusion can be carried over to other areas of the law. Thus, 
rules of private law, company law, administrative law, etc., which divert 
from the community’s strong moral intuitions should have a parallel 
adverse effect on the citizens’ attitude to the law. Note that the damage 
to the sense of respect for the law is not limited to the specific area of 
law in which the perceived injustice is to be found. Research shows that 
in the face of a perceived injustice of a legal rule or result (in various 
areas from duties of landlord and tenants to civil forfeiture) people 
tend to flout the law as a whole in many subtle, lower level and harder-to-
detect ways such as littering, tax avoidance and services theft.67
These findings have deep ramifications for areas in which the 
common law is so keen on realising the rule of law ideals of predictability, 
clarity and generality that it is willing to severely compromise the 
moral merits of the legal result. Think of the numerous situations in 
which the common law would enforce bright-line rules of property and 
contract law and refuse to make exceptions for circumstances where an 
opportunistic party used these rules to relinquish her moral responsibility 
for the defendant in a way that strongly offends the public’s sense of 
66. Robinson & Darley, supra note 65 at 6. 
67. As argued by many and demonstrated in empirical research by Janice 
Nadler, “Flouting the Law” (2005) 83:5 Texas Law Review 1399 at 1401.
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justice and fairness.68 The strict Caveat Emptor rule is an excellent 
example of this willingness on the part of the common law to sacrifice 
the moral credibility of the legal result at the altar of the rule of law 
desiderata of certainty, predictability and generality. As we saw, even its 
proponents admit that the results of the Caveat Emptor rule stand in 
stark contradiction to people’s moral intuitions. Moreover, as will 
become clear in the next section, a deeper scrutiny reveals that the 
moral standing of the Caveat Emptor rule is much more dubious than its 
proponents claim, and the gut feeling that it departs from basic moral 
norms is correct. At the same time, the rule allows shrewd actors to 
take unconscionable advantage of its clear-cut edges, i.e. they would be 
able to enjoy the clarity of its application, and obtain an advantage that 
68. Examples abound: in the context of negotiation to transfer rights in land, 
the common law would allow A to evade responsibility for B’s detrimental 
reliance on A’s words as long as they were not put down in writing; C can 
insist on enforcing a contract with D, regardless of the fact that it is clear 
that the document fails to accurately record the agreement of the parties 
as intended; E would be allowed to keep property which he inherited 
in a will, even where he orally promised the deceased to hand it over to 
someone else (as such gifts did not abide by the writing formalities of the 
Wills Act). In these and many other cases, the claimants could prove the 
morally relevant facts of their case: the pledge, the reliance, the frustrated 
expectation, the promise to a dying friend. But the crystal clear rules 
which regulate the transfer of property rights, bequests of property upon 
death and the interpretation of contracts trample the moral obligation 
under foot. The courts of equity, in contrast, paid close attention to the 
particularity of the situation, and employed open-ended conscience-based 
principles that enabled them to trace the pattern of moral responsibility 
in each case. Accordingly, in the above situations, writing formalities were 
waived so that the defendants were made to account for a setback in the 
claimant’s life which they encouraged him to take risks (in “proprietary 
estoppel” (e.g. in Crabb v Arun District Council, [1975] EWCA Civ 7 
a gap between the wording of the contract and parties’ intention could 
give rise to a right to rescind e.g. Mackenzie v Coulson (1869), LR 8 Eq 
368 (Ch (Eng)); and promisors were made to fulfil their promises to the 
dead man, even where testamentary rules were not complied with (via the 
equitable doctrine of secret trusts e.g. McCormick v Grogan (1869), LR 4 
HL 82.
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offends our shared conscience. 
The common law’s treatment of un-induced unilateral mistake 
is therefore afflicted with a dangerous fissure between the defendant’s 
(lack of ) legal liability and his moral duties towards the claimant. The 
Caveat Emptor rule is not the only context in which the courts are ready 
to bite the bullet and concede a deep inconsistency between legal and 
moral duty in relation to the defendant’s actions. Their attitude to such 
unfortunate conflicts can be one of complacency:
the application of... [legal] propositions may produce a result which appears 
unfair. So be it…I am convinced that in determining rights, particularly 
property rights, the only justice that can be attained by mortals… [is] justice 
which flows from the application of sure and settled principles.69 
Equity adopted a very different approach. The courts of equity 
were willing to change the legal result and compromise the clarity, 
generality and predictability of the common law rules in order to avoid 
a dangerous fissure between the pattern of moral responsibility and that 
of legal liability for the same set of facts. In order to align moral and 
legal responsibility, the courts of equity would pay close attention to the 
particularity of the situation, and employ open-ended conscience-based 
principles that enable them to track the pattern of moral responsibility 
in each case. In that way, they stave off the serious danger created by the 
common law tendency to lose sight of the importance of maintaining 
equilibrium between intuitive perception of the morally right result and 
abstract considerations of common good (in the form of unity and 
reliability of the legal rules). Instead of sticking blindly to formalistic 
rule of law requirements, equity listens to the warning of Justice Marshall 
of the US Supreme Court: “however admirable its resolute adherence 
to the law as it was, a decision contrary to the public sense of justice 
[would] … diminish respect for the courts and for law itself ”.70
This, I believe, is the essence of the conscionability standard: it 
69. Cowcher v Cowcher, [1972] 1 All ER 943 (Fam) at 948, per Justice 
Bagnall.
70. Flood v Kuhn, 407 US 258 (1972)(Justice Marshall, dissenting, quoting 
from Peter L Szanton, “Stare Decisis: A Dissenting View” (1959) 10:4 
Hastings Law Journal 394 at 397).
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directs the court to find out whether assisting the defendant to 
enforce his common law right would tip the balance between the 
need to preserve the rule of law virtues of the norm and the need 
to ensure accountability correspondence. If it so does, then equity will 
prevent the defendant from standing on his rights so as to restore the 
correlation between the legal consequences of the defendant’s actions and 
the pattern of moral rights and duties that it gives rise to. The law would 
thus be made to support the inter-personal morality of the parties, and 
as a result, strengthen the legitimacy of the system in the eyes of the 
community. 
But the conscionability standard is not only for the courts. It 
can, thanks to its strong connotation, be used by the citizens to guide 
their behaviour.71 By using a term like “conscience” that is universally 
associated with morally-oriented deliberation as a foundation for legal 
liability, equity sends a strong message to the citizens that the law expects 
them to rise above considerations of self-interest even when they deal 
with other market participants. It tells them that the call of conscience 
should be heeded not only when dealing with family and friends, but 
also when doing business with strangers. Their conscience (if they 
keep it in good working condition) will tell them how to plan their 
actions so that they end up on the right side of the law. The call of 
conscience should be used by the law’s addressees as an additional source 
of information, which they must consult (on top of legal instruments 
and balance sheets) when deciding whether, and how, to use their 
legal rights. Once this message is internalised, people will work hard 
to nurture and protect this inner compass from conscience-muting 
71. For a presentation of the expressivist theory of law see Elizabeth S 
Anderson & Richard H Pildes, “Expressive Theories of Law: A General 
Restatement” (2000) 148:5 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 
1503. On the potential of the expressive character of law to lift the 
moral standards of its addressees see sources in Kenworthey Bilz & Janice 
Nadler, “Law, Psychology, and Morality” in Brian H Ross, ed, Psychology 
of Learning and Motivation, vol 50 (New York: Academic Press, 2009) at 
102.
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mechanisms of rationalisation and self-deception;72 for otherwise they 
may lose a valuable guide to the do and don’ts of behaviour in market. 
They will understand, in other words, that feelings of guilt and shame 
are warning signs not only of moral culpability, but also of potential 
trouble with the law, which may cost them dear.
If my account of the reference to conscience is viable, the court of 
equity sees itself as appealing to the defendant’s ability to decipher the 
moral intricacies of her situation, arrive at correct appreciation of her 
moral duty and act on it. Once she does not so act, because she chose 
to ignore the call of her conscience, or to give in to conscience silencing 
psychological mechanisms, she will not be allowed to take shelter behind 
a formal ideal of the rule of law and the values of certainty, clarity and 
generality it enshrines. In the next section, I move to inspect more closely 
the claims in favour of the Caveat Emptor rule. We will see that in fact, 
our instinctive response to the Caveat Emptor rule, which was dismissed 
in Smith v Hughes73 as the sensibility of a “tender conscience”, closely 
traces the result of a deeper analysis of the values the rule instantiates and 
the social benefits it may generate. Equity, I will claim, should therefore 
step (back) in, and change the Caveat Emptor rule so as to realign the 
moral responsibility with the legal liability of a person who let the other 
party sign a contract in the knowledge that she misses a critical piece 
of information about the deal.
72. On our strong tendency to succumb to self-deception and rationalisation 
about the moral standing of our actions see for example Alfred R Mele, 
Self-Deception Unmasked, Princeton Monographs in Philosophy (New 
York: Princeton University Press, 2003); Michael K Green, “Kant and 
Moral Self-Deception” (1992) 83 Kant-Studien 149 at 164; and Daniel 
Goleman, Vital Lies, Simple Truths: The Psychology Of Self-Deception (New 
York: Simon & Schuster, 1996) part II at 55-91. 
73. Supra note 14.
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IV. The Moral Demerits of the Caveat Emptor Rule, 
and Why Equity is the Right Way to Correct 
Them
In this section, I want to show that the justifications provided for the 
Caveat Emptor rule are either defective on their own terms, wrongly 
presented as ideology free, or too slight to justify the stark departure 
from moral standards which it embodies. As the discussion unfolds it will 
become clear why a norm based on a conscionability standard is highly 
suitable to fix the deep problems of the current bright line rule. We will 
see that, indeed, efficiency considerations which ought to inform a 
good solution to the disclosure conundrum can many times be addressed 
by a set of fine-tuned well defined rules. But a truly successful ordering 
of disclosure duties in the pre-contractual stage would require an open-
ended standard which combines clear guidelines with room for discretion 
in applying moral criteria.
Melvin Eisenberg summarises the view of many when he writes that 
“social morality indicates that if one actor knows a material fact that is 
relevant to the transaction, and knows that the other actor does not know 
the fact, non-disclosure is sharp dealing, or a kind of moral fraud”.74 In 
Part II above, I tried to show that the Caveat Emptor rule is not merely 
a reflection of a different attitude to the ethical standards in business (or 
the lack thereof ); it is not just that “conduct which on the continent is 
regarded as fraud is regarded in England as good business”.75 The claim 
was that an array of arguments show that, on deeper inspection, the 
Caveat Emptor rule serves the common good on more than one level, 
and that therefore its unpalatable surface belies its real moral merit. In 
what follows, I address these arguments and argue that, in most cases, 
the Caveat Emptor rule does not serve the common good, but rather the 
interests of a small section of the public. To make the law on un-induced 
unilateral mistakes do justice in the wide range of cases to which it applies, 
the Caveat Emptor rule should become a carefully curved exception to 
74. Melvin Eisenberg, “Disclosure in Contract Law” (2003) 91:6 California 
Law Review 1645 at 1653-65.
75. Beale, supra note 4 at 73.
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a general rule that would require disclosure of critical information in 
the pre-contractual stage.76
A. Legal Duty to Prevent Harm
The Caveat Emptor rule, we saw, can be read as motivated by the belief 
that legal duties “to do X”, and in particular to save strangers from 
predicaments you did not cause, unduly infringes on personal freedom. 
However, the reasons behind the “no duty to save” policy are not 
incontestable, and their applicability to the case of unilateral mistake is 
particularly dubious. First, the idea that moral responsibility changes in 
such a dramatic way between actions and omissions is far from consensual. 
For some serious thinkers, our tendency to feel less guilty for failing to 
help, than for inflicting harm, is nothing but a rationalisation that enables 
us to keep to our comfortable lives.77 Moreover, it is widely agreed that 
special relationships, like friendship, mentorship or parenthood, break 
down the distinction (as much as there is one) between responsibility 
for damaging action, and responsibility for omitting to help. Teachers, 
for example, are not only under a moral obligation not to molest their 
pupils, but they are also obligated to act when they suspect that a pupil 
76. See also Eisenberg, supra note 74 (“The law should require disclosure of 
material facts except in those classes of cases in which a requirement of 
disclosure would entail significant efficiency costs” at 1655); Zamir & 
Medina, supra note 17 who say that the set of rules on pre-contractual 
deception, which is informed by considerations of morality, as well as 
of efficiency, “should prohibit all forms of deception, including false 
assertions, half-truths, and silence” at 278; and Nicholas J Mcbride 
“Rescission of Settlement for Mistake and Non-disclosure” (1999) 58:3 
Cambridge Law Journal 461, n 46.
77. As helping those in need is so much more demanding than merely 
avoiding causing unnecessary pain. See for instance Jonathan Glover, 
Causing Death and Saving Lives (London: Penguin Group, 1977) ch 7; 
Jonathan Bennett, “Whatever the Consequences” (1966) 26 Analysis 83. 
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is being abused by others.78 Association can differentiate the person in 
need of help from the nameless mass of strangers so that a duty to go out 
of your way to help (and not merely refrain from harming) arises.
The situation of parties to contractual negotiation arguably gives rise 
to a proximity that can beget a positive duty to correct other people’s 
mistakes. The strong policy consideration against enacting positive 
legal duties can be suspended in that case because the number of 
strangers whom you are requested to assist is well defined and limited. 
Indeed, if the defendant is a business owner who engages in contractual 
negotiations much of the day, the number of strangers whose mistake 
it would be his responsibility to correct would be high. But even 
then, he will only need to correct those mistakes of which he knows, or 
should have known. In such cases, a flexible unconscionability standard 
would become handy: an equitable standard will allow the court to look 
closely at the particular case and mark out those errors that, given the 
volume of the defendant’s business and the interaction he in fact had 
with the complainant, she could not expect him to correct. This is likely 
to change from one case to another, but the conscionability standard 
should give enough guidance to parties as to when they are expected to 
save a person, with whom they are negotiating, from acting under a 
mistake. In this way, a cleverly deployed equitable rule can point out 
those cases where a duty to assist another person in trouble would be too 
onerous to be imposed by the law (even if in morality one may be obliged 
to do so).
B. Who’s Self-Reliance?
A major building block in the justification of the Caveat Emptor rule is 
a value laden distinction between a proactive party who makes all the 
78. See Irit Samet, “Proprietary Estoppel and Responsibility for Omissions” 
(2015) 78:1 Modern Law Review 85. A similar change in responsibility 
levels happens with people who hold special positions such as community 
leaders. In equity, land owners are expected to correct strangers’ mistakes 
about their proprietary rights, or otherwise, forever hold their piece, as 
the doctrine of proprietary estoppel will force them to accept the situation 
assumed by the stranger’s action.
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necessary inquiries and a lacklustre one who waits for others to supply her 
with the material she needs in order to make an informed choice about 
the contract. Whether you put it in terms of the state’s role in fostering 
the virtue of self-reliance, or of the law’s aim to promote efficiency (here, 
by incentivising entrepreneurial spirit), the message is similar: the law 
will not assist those who cannot be bothered to take care of their own 
business. But such presentation of the way in which the Caveat Emptor 
rule operates is misleading. In its current universal application, what it 
does many times is simply allow the strong to prevail over the weak. As 
Hugh Beale observed: 
the caveat emptor approach depends on the buyer being sophisticated enough 
to ask the right questions—or to take advice. And the latter is not just a 
question of sophistication; it is also one of the cost of taking legal advice.79 
The idea that the Caveat Emptor rule rewards the entrepreneurial is built 
on an assumption that the parties are equal in their ability to assemble 
all the information they require, and that whether they in fact did so 
is down to their approach, i.e. a “go-getter” or a “sitting on the fence” 
type. But since the rule covers the whole spectrum of potential parties to 
contracts, from big business to small and medium ones, as well as private 
people, its operation often merely reflects the power relations between 
the parties, not their virtues or vices.
And just as the Caveat Emptor rule does not necessarily recompense 
the industrious, disclosure duties do not, usually, reward laziness. Treatise 
writers in the nineteenth century were already careful to note that in 
proscribing non-disclosure, equity took care not to protect the negligent. 
There was “no case in which the Court of Equity had been successfully 
asked to interpose in favour of a man who wilfully was ignorant of that 
79. Beale, supra note 4 at 28. Later, at 30 he maintains that the presence of 
“a blanket rule of non-disclosure … [expresses] a very strong ideological 
message about self-reliance, or [shows that] that we are unable to devise a 
workable rule to deal with the problem”.
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which he ought to have known”.80 The standard of conscionability is 
flexible enough to allow the court to factor in the expectation that 
people do what they can to look after their affairs to the best of their 
ability. The particularistic nature of the equitable inquiry allows the judge 
to ask to what extent the specific claimant is responsible for her ignorance 
with regards to a crucial matter that concerns her position. From the 
point of view of a party who considers whether to spend the time and 
resources on finding the information she needs — and it may take a 
lot of time and money to find out what exactly one should ask once 
we venture beyond the standard set of questions — it would be very 
unwise to sit back and rely on the disclosure requirement. For “there is 
no certainty that the existence of your mistake will become known to 
the other party and so trigger the duty to point it out”.81 It is even less 
certain that the other party would be deemed as someone who “should 
have known” about your mistake and as unconscionable in failing to 
correct it. A disclosure duty would not incentivise a "sit around" attitude 
to information gathering. It is the party who is unconscious even of the 
possibility of making further inquiries who is most likely to fall back on 
the disclosure duty of the other side.
C. Certainty and Other Legal Virtues
From the point of view of the rule of law ideal, we saw, the Caveat 
Emptor rule is an exemplary legal norm. It has a minimal penumbra of 
uncertainty, its operation is hence easy to predict, and it applies across a 
wide range of cases so that a nuanced understanding of the phenomenon 
is not necessary in order to assess its effect on one’s actions. However, this 
fit with the rule of law virtues of certainty, predictability and generality 
comes at a high price. The gap that the Caveat Emptor rule opens between 
the pattern of legal liability and that of moral duty is deep and, for reasons 
80. Duke of Beaufort v Joseph Neeld, [1845] 8 ER 1399 (HL) as in MacMillan, 
supra note 2 at 50 (and more cases cited there). Similar limitation can be 
found in the French law and the principles of European contract law, see 
Beale supra note 4. See also Eisenberg, supra note 74 at 1684-85.
81. Beale, supra note 4 at 82.
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I reviewed in Part III, dangerous.82 If equity (re)assumes its authority to 
intervene in order to close (or, at least, narrow) this gap, will the result 
be fatal to the certainty of the law on un-induced unilateral mistake? 
Not necessarily. The first thing to note is that mistakes about a critical 
aspect of the contract are only likely to occur in out-of-the-ordinary 
contracts, or with regards to odd pieces of information. This is because 
run of the mill situations will very often be covered by standard practices 
of investigations and off-the-shelf questionnaires.83 Moreover, especially 
when it comes to sellers, a disclosure duty should not introduce a big 
transformation in the current practice. Ample research in economics 
shows that sellers will frequently share information with the other party 
even if they have no legal obligation to do so, as the advantage gained 
by non-disclosure will often unravel under competition.84 In addition, 
numerous statutes and regulations require disclosure by sellers.85 This 
means that only in a limited number of cases would the equitable norm 
operate to undo a deal to which one party only entered because she 
was unaware of a critical piece of information known to the other party.
Moreover, one of the biggest benefits of a clear certain rule, namely, 
that people can calculate its effects on their action and plan accordingly 
(by purchasing insurance, etc.) does not pertain to the typical case of a 
unilateral mistake. Unilateral mistakes often come as a nasty surprise, 
not as a realisation of risk whose chances of occurring one could have 
82. As celebrated novels like Michael Frayn’s Headlong testify, the existence 
of the “no need to disclose” rule is known to the wide public (New York: 
Faber & Faber, 1999). The book describes the disastrous results of an 
attempt to take advantage of the rule in the context of art dealings, and 
was shortlisted for the Man Booker Prize. 
83. Many such forms can be found on the internet; for the sale of land see 
for instance <http://www.houseweb.co.uk/house/sell/hips/PIQ.pdf>; 
for sale of business see <http://www.certifiedacquisitions.com/uploads/
Seller_Questionnaire.pdf>. 
84. Eisenberg, supra note 74 at 1678 (and sources cited there).
85. E.g. The Consumer Protection from Unfair Trading Regulations 2008 (UK), 
SI 2008/1277 s 6; The Provision of Services Regulations 2009 (UK), SI 
2009/2999 s 8; consultation on The Occupational and Personal Pension 
Schemes (Disclosure of Information)(Amendment) Regulations 2015 (UK), SI 
2015/482. 
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calculated in advance. A description of the Caveat Emptor rule in terms 
of certainty would not cut much ice with the surprised party, especially if 
she is a non-specialist and therefore expects the law to mirror the widely 
shared moral intuition that the other party should have alerted her that 
she labours under an error. Another point to note is that the effect 
of uncertainty on third parties would be dramatically reduced due to 
the way in which equity protects bona fides purchasers.86 The worry lest 
third parties will have to bear the risk of relying on a contract that is in 
fact voidable strongly militates against releasing the mistaken party from 
the contract. Equity, with its built-in mechanism of sheltering innocent 
outsiders from such risks is thus well suited for the task of reforming the 
Caveat Emptor rule.
Furthermore, as I explained in Part III, the standard of 
conscionability can be used by the law’s addressees as a useful guide, 
even if it cannot achieve the level of certainty secured by fixed ex-ante 
rules. In the context of un-induced unilateral mistakes, a norm that 
instructs you to reveal critical information, if you suspect that the other 
party is unaware of it, is pretty clear and certain.87 True, as we will 
see below, a successful disclosure duty would include some exceptions 
whose application requires court discretion. In the large majority of 
cases, however, a duty to alert the other party to a mistake that is known 
to you may be burdensome, but is in no way unclear. Certainty is 
therefore mainly jeopardised by the availability of a remedy where 
one party should have known about the other party’s mistake. The 
extent to which a conscionable person ought to infer that the other 
party is ignorant and take steps to ascertain it may, indeed, be less 
than clear-cut. Nevertheless, the reference to conscience — a concept 
whose moralistic connotations are obvious to everyone — directs the 
law’s addressees towards an ethical approach to the issue of ignorance in 
pre-contractual negotiation. A conscience in a good working condition, 
86. That was already the case when equity granted rescission for unilateral 
mistakes in the 18th and 19th century: see MacMillan, supra note 2.
87. See Beale, supra note 4 at 119-22. For another way of reducing the 
effect of uncertainty is to allow opt out in business to business (“B2B”) 
contracts.
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i.e. an alert sensitive inner compass, would tell its owner that the less 
than favourable conditions which the other party agrees to may be a 
result of some ignorance on his part (rather than, say, generosity, lack 
of experience or absentmindedness). Conscience would drive the party 
in the know to ask “by the way, did you know that X?” even when that 
may rob him of an advantage, and the conscionability standard would 
make it clear that, to stir clear of the law, one should follow this advice. 
This is not the certainty of a fixed ex-ante general rule, but it is a legal 
principle that definitely offers the parties to contractual negotiations a 
useful guide on how to conduct themselves so as to avoid interference 
by the state. A conscionability-based duty of disclosure will therefore 
strike a better balance between the value of certainty and the ideal of 
accountability coherence, i.e. a state of affairs in which the law follows 
the pattern of moral responsibility in the circumstances.88 
D. Generating (very little) Socially-Beneficial 
Information
One of the most compelling arguments in favour of the Caveat Emptor 
rule is the way in which it incentivises the entrepreneurial to obtain 
useful information about other people’s property. While the lacklustre 
owner fails to fully realise the potential of the resource over which she 
was given control, the eager beaver probes the quality of her property, 
tempted by the chance of making a nice turnover if he manages to buy 
it from her for what she thinks it is worth. This is all very nice, but in 
fact the Caveat Emptor rule can potentially encourage socially valuable 
investigations in a very limited number of factual scenarios, while its 
application is general and far-reaching. If we look at the problem of un-
induced unilateral mistake from a perspective of economic efficiency, 
our point of departure should be that mistakes always increase the 
resources which must be devoted to the process of allocating goods to 
88. See Beale, ibid (who says about his suggestion for disclosure duty: “I 
think that this proposal, though less certain than the current law, would 
nonetheless be workable. Rules that are a great deal less certain are used in 
countries whose economies seem as successful as our own” at 99).
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their highest-valuing users.89 And so, a rule that allows the enforcement 
of contracts which are based on an error must be justified by showing 
that the benefits it entails exceed the costs inherent to mistakes. A closer 
look at the Caveat Emptor rule reveals that it incentivises valuable 
investigations only in very specific cases, with the result that the current 
wholesale right to withhold information is inefficient.
Since Kronman’s 1978 ground-breaking paper on the efficiency of 
disclosure duties, it has been the consensus that, broadly speaking, we 
should distinguish between information that was acquired by a party in 
a “casual” manner and information which she deliberately obtained, as 
only the latter ought to be protected by a right not to disclose.90 Why, 
from efficiency point of view, should we oblige the party who casually 
came by a relevant piece of information to reveal it to the other party? 
Mistakes, like accidents, are costly, and in principle should be avoided 
“since the actual occurrence of the mistake, always (potentially) increases 
the resources which must be devoted to the process of allocating goods 
to their highest valuing users”.91 Only if non-disclosure generates a 
substantial social benefit should the informed party be allowed to keep it 
to herself. Casually getting hold of information which is relevant to other 
people’s property does not generate sufficient social benefit to justify the 
cost of allowing a mistake to determine the course of a contract.92 But 
neither is it the case that all deliberate acquisitions of information are 
beneficial to such a degree that encouraging them warrants a right to keep 
it to yourself; it all depends on the kind of information thus attained. 
For instance, in contrast with the famous US Supreme Court decision 
89. Kronman, supra note 33; see also Zamir & Medina, supra note 17 (who 
conclude: “Ordinarily, the cost of transferring the correct information 
to the uninformed party is small and its benefit clear. Accordingly, 
prohibitions against deceit and pre-contractual disclosure duties are prima 
facie efficient” at 269).
90. Kronman, supra note 33 at 13. 
91. Ibid at 2-3.
92. Stumbling on information by chance is indifferent to incentives to act one 
way or another. See more detailed argument in Eisenberg, supra note 74 at 
1656-61.
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in Laidlaw v Organ,93 the deliberate obtainment of mere foreknowledge 
(i.e. information that will, in due time, be evident to all) is not worthy 
of encouragement as it does not increase the pie, only the share of the 
person who happened to have the information.94
Another substantial limitation on the ability of the Caveat Emptor 
rule to incentivise the search for socially beneficial information relates to 
the position of sellers. As Melvin Eisenberg shows,95 the distinguishing 
characteristics of sellers make it the case that they should always 
be required to disclose material facts concerning their property. Sellers 
typically have asymmetric access to adventitiously acquired information 
about the property they are selling, while they are sufficiently incentivised 
to look for other information about a property they own; they do not 
need the extra incentive in the form of a right to withhold information 
about the subject matter of the contract.96 From the perspective of clarity 
and predictability it would have been good if the disclosure duty could 
swiftly apply to all sellers. But justice and efficiency dictate some fine-
tuned exceptions. Thus, when a universally known practice in a specific 
market (e.g. commercial real estate) is one of “each party to herself ”, 
expectation that information would be disclosed cannot be justified. 
Similarly, if a party was ignorant about a material fact in circumstances 
where a diligent buyer would have been put on notice, or because she 
failed to conduct a reasonable research, the law should not absolve her 
93. 15 US (2 Wheat) 178 (1817) [Laidlaw].
94. Hirshleifer, supra note 32 at 562; Laidlaw, supra note 93; Robert Cooter 
& Thomas Ulen, Law and Economics, 3d (New York: Addison-Wesley, 
2000) at 273-74. Many cases of foreknowledge would fall under what 
Cooter and Ulen called “redistributive information”, i.e. such that only 
“creates a bargaining advantage that can be used to redistribute wealth in 
favor of the informed party”. Working to obtain this kind of knowledge 
is socially wasteful and should be discouraged by imposing disclosure 
duties. Only with regards to information that “can be used to produce 
more wealth”, we can show that “[e]fficiency demands giving people 
strong incentives to [produce it] …” by exempting them from the duty to 
disclose it at 273-74.
95. Supra note 74. 
96. Ibid (see detailed discussion at 1674-77); Zamir & Medina, supra note 17 
at 272.
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of her contractual obligations.97 The disclosure duty of sellers should 
therefore be drafted as a standard which, while it establishes a pretty 
general duty of disclosure for sellers, does allow the court to peg the 
sellers’ duty of disclosure to the level of their moral responsibility for this 
particular erroneous buyer.
In contrast with the above rule that mandates a disclosure duty on 
sellers which can be, all and all, reasonably clear on the edges, a just 
and efficient regulation of buyers’ disclosure duties will have to take the 
form of a flexible open-ended standard that accommodates the more 
prevalent exceptions to the duty to alert the seller to her mistake. 
Apart from the above case of the studious buyer who worked hard to 
reveal hidden qualities of a piece of property, in some social context the 
pre-contractual interaction is best understood as a game in which buyers 
troll for mistakes by sellers. Used book trades and art auctions are the 
most obvious examples of such social games — where sellers cannot 
legitimately expect buyers to reveal their assessment that the item they 
wish to buy is actually worth much more than the owner’s asking price.98 
Other, less obvious, situations may fall into this category, and a space 
should be left for the court to exercise discretion as to whether this is 
the case. Another set of circumstances where a buyer should be allowed 
to keep critical information to himself is where 
a certain [building] project requires assembling a considerable number of 
parcels. Revealing the entrepreneur’s plan to prospective sellers would result 
in … a ‘holdout’ [i.e. some agents may exploit the need for their consent 
to extract a portion of the producer surplus in excess of their opportunity 
costs].99
A duty to disclose information in this case would thus open the door not 
only to inefficiency but to opportunism and an unfair distribution of the 
97. See examples in Eisenberg, supra note 74 at 1683-85.
98. Ibid at 1686; see also Peter Walker, “Multimillion-dollar Photo of Billy 
the Kid Playing Croquet was $2 Junk Shop Find”, The Guardian (13 
October 2015), online: <www.theguardian.com/us-news/2015/oct/13/
billy-the-kid-croquet-junk-shop-two-dollars> (example of a photo bought 
for $2 in a junk shop and sold for $2.3 million can be found in this 
article).
99. Zamir & Medina, supra note 17 at 273. 
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pie.100
The bottom line of all these complex considerations is that the 
Caveat Emptor rule increases the efficient use of property only in a 
narrow range of cases which involve resourceful buyers. And even in 
these cases, the claim that the only (or by far the best) way to incentivise 
socially valuable explorations of other people’s property is to allow the 
entrepreneurial buyer to keep critical information to himself has not 
gone unchallenged.101 Anyway, as Eisenberg clearly shows, the chances 
that in our times one will be able to find out valuable information 
about another’s property (such as the existence of minerals or natural 
gas) are slim, while exploration companies that engage in the business 
do not exploit the right to withhold information in their negotiations 
with owners.102 In most cases of industrious parties who worked hard to 
discover hidden qualities of property they do not own, the claim that one 
has a right not to share his findings with the owner will not be raised. 
In some other situations, court discretion would be necessary in order 
to avoid holdouts and for adjusting liability to responsibility in special 
100. It is worthwhile mentioning that up until now courts in the US have 
failed to tailor their decisions in contract disputes in accordance with legal 
economics finding about the utility of each course of action: see Kimberly 
D Krawiec & Kathryn Zeiler, “Common-Law Disclosure Duties and 
the Sin of Omission: Testing the Meta-Theories” (2005) 91:8 Virginia 
Law Review 1795 at 1818-21 who argue, on the basis of a large scale 
statistical survey of American cases, that courts are not more likely to 
require disclosure when the information is casually acquired as opposed 
to deliberately acquired; see also Eric A Posner, “Economic Analysis of 
Contract Law After Three Decades: Success of Failure?” (2003) 112:3 
Yale Law Journal 829 (the answer is “failure”, at least when it comes to 
influence on actual courts’ decisions).
101. Other mechanisms to profit from the obtainment of such information 
are at hand. For example, where inheritance goes to next of kin, no 
matter how remote, you find people who specialise in tracing such remote 
relatives of lone deceased. They then approach the potential heir with 
the promise to reveal the identity of the long lost relative in return for a 
hefty percentage of the inheritance. A similar approach can be taken with 
respect to unknown qualities of one’s property.
102. Eisenberg, supra note 74 at 1687-91.
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market conditions. The bottom line is that the secrecy allowed by Caveat 
Emptor rule ought to become an exception to a general standard which 
obligates disclosure in the pre-contractual stage as required by justice 
and efficiency. Again, a conscionability based standard which allows 
the court to exclude such scenarios from a general disclosure duty would 
work very well.
V. Conclusion
The law on un-induced unilateral mistakes probably comes into effect 
only in a rather small number of contract cases. Economic reality and 
practices which developed over the years often lead both sellers and 
buyers to be frank about their assessment of the subject matter of the 
contract. Nevertheless, the decision taken by each legal system as to the 
duty of people who negotiate a contract to save the other party from 
making a costly error says a lot about its most fundamental values. The 
message that it sends to the parties about the ethical level they should 
aspire to attain ripples well beyond the specific issue of disclosure. In 
the case of the English Caveat Emptor rule, the common law professes 
a set of individualistic values, or tolerance of sheer selfishness, that do 
not reflect the moral convictions of the wider community. Arguments to 
show that the Caveat Emptor rule actually embodies a commitment to 
a  lofty rule of law ideal and promotes economic utility fail to show that 
the alternative (viz a fairly wide duty of disclosure that follows ethical 
standards) will seriously undermine the law’s aspiration to legality, or 
efficiency. On the contrary, the disutility of mistakes and erosion of the 
legal system’s legitimacy — both clear risks of the Caveat Emptor rule — 
strongly militate against adhering to the current law. A change is needed; 
but by what means? 
English law, I have argued, has a ready-made device for introducing 
the necessary reform: the nineteenth century equitable jurisdiction to 
rescind a contract where insisting on its performance (or expectation 
damages) would be unconscionable since the defendant knew, or 
should have known, that the claimant only entered the deal because 
she was ignorant of a crucial fact. An ex-post flexible standard of that kind 
will allow the court to take into account subtle differences between 
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cases which may change the moral standing of the defendant and/or the 
benefit to society from forcing a disclosure duty in a particular case. 
Moving from the bright-line Caveat Emptor rule to a conscionability-
based standard would indeed detract from the certainty of the law in that 
area. But equity does not simply neglect the rule of law value; it is bent 
on reintroducing a balance between the demands of clarity, generality 
and predictability, and the ideal of coherence between law and moral 
principles. We saw how the invocation of conscience provides a pretty 
good guide on how the law would apply in different situations — a guide 
that relies on our inbuilt ability to recognise, and be motivated by, our 
moral duty. Coupled with the demand that the mistake is substantial 
and an in-built protection for innocent third parties, an equitable 
conscionability-based disclosure duty will lend relatively few surprises on 
people who know the law and think about it seriously. The unfortunate 
situation of un-induced unilateral mistake is thus an excellent example 
of the prowess of equity: through its carefully-developed mechanisms it 
is able to realign legal liability and moral responsibility in a way which 
is respectful of the rule of law ideal and sensitive to the shared values of 
the community. 
